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Blockchain Empowers Social Resistance and Terrorism
Through Decentralized Autonomous Organizations
Abstract
The invention of the Internet has changed the way social resistance, revolutionary
movements and terror groups are organized with new features such as loose network
organization, netwars, social media campaigns, and lone wolf attacks. This article argues
that blockchain technology will lead to more far-reaching changes in the organization of
resistance to authority. Blockchain is a distributed ledger that records transactions using a
consensus protocol, and when it meets objective conditions, it also enables smart contracts
that execute transactions. Blockchain technology is not only a system for transferring
value, but also it is a trustless system in which strangers can cooperate without the need
for having to trust each other, as computer code governs their interactions. Blockchain will
not only allow resistance/ terror organizations to easily receive donations globally, to have
assets that a government can easily confiscate, and to disseminate censorship-resistant
propaganda, but more importantly, to operate and cooperate across the world in a truly
leaderless, coordinated, and highly decentralized fashion. Governments will need to be
more proactive in the area of blockchain technology to mitigate some of the dangers to
political stability that may emerge from it.
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Introduction
Blockchain Technology (BT) or Distributed Ledger Technology has entered
the public consciousness. Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin have also
sparked growing government concerns about potential negative social
consequences of the technology, especially as it relates to facilitating crime
and terrorism.1 For example, Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin has
recently declared that cryptocurrencies pose a national security threat, as
malicious actors may use them to fund illicit activities.2 Unfortunately, this
narrow focus on money laundering in the growing national security debate
of BT and other virtual currencies is not helpful in terms of understanding
the true potential of blockchains or how this technology could change the
organization and practices of social, civil, nonviolent and violent resistance
to government and other authorities. Gene Sharp suggested that
“nonviolent action is a generic term covering dozens of specific methods of
protest, noncooperation and intervention. In all of these, the resisters
conduct the conflict by doing – or refusing to do – certain acts by means
other than violence.”3 These acts can range from political activism, to acts
of civil disobedience, and to mass protests and strikes. What begins as
nonviolent resistance may later turn into terrorism, rebellion, and
revolution. Social or civil resistance is often leaderless and relies on
voluntarism: individuals can choose to join a cause by participating in
collective actions that signify resistance or by supporting resistance acts of
others.
The Internet has become a powerful enabler of social resistance and hence
a threat to authority due to its decentralized nature. John Arquilla and
David Ronfeldt argued already in the 1990s that the Internet “disrupts and
erodes the hierarchies around which institutions are normally designed. It
diffuses and redistributes power, often to the benefit of what may be
considered weaker, smaller actors. It crosses borders and redraws the
boundaries of offices and responsibilities. It expands the spatial and
temporal horizons that actors should take into account. And thus it
compels closed systems to open up.”4 Arquilla and Ronfeldt claimed that
the Internet encourages network organization and enables new modes of
conflict centered on communications and networks.
Arquilla’s and Ronfeldt’s analysis from the 1990s was extremely prescient,
considering the rise and weaponization of social media that has enabled
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numerous digital insurgencies by pro-democracy movements that have
threatened and have sometimes even overthrown established corrupt
power elites in the color revolutions of the Arab Spring and in Ukraine.
According to Eric Schmidt, the former Google CEO, and Jared Cohen, a
former State Department official, “[t]here can be little doubt that the near
future will be full of revolutionary movements, as communication
technologies enable new connections and generate more room for
expression.”5 They claim that technology will make revolutionary
movements more efficient as activists around the world can exchange their
ideas, as technology will provide more anonymity to them and as people
can join and assist revolutionary movements with limited commitment
and risk for themselves, “making revolutionary gestures permanent.”6
This article aims to investigate how diverse social movements and
resistance organizations can utilize BT to further their social, political, or
criminal objectives. In particular, this article will explore how
transparency advocacy groups, pro-democracy groups, hacktivists,
revolutionary movements, as well as terror organizations, and even
criminal syndicates can leverage BT and associated organizational
innovations such as Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs).
The article argues that BT and DAOs could change the dynamics of social
or civil resistance, its effectiveness, and its resilience in the face of
countermeasures by governments. It will also provide policy
recommendations.

Part I: Cryptocurrency
Satoshi Nakamoto proposed BT in his White Paper in 2008, where he
described Bitcoin as a “peer-to-peer version of electronic cash.”7 The
White Paper forms the basis of Bitcoin and many other cryptocurrencies.
Bitcoin likely emerged from the cypherpunk movement and its inventor(s)
clearly intended it to offer an alternative to the global financial system that
came close to collapse in 2008.8 Due to its opposition to the fiat currency
system Bitcoin is plausibly itself a form social resistance as many early
cryptocurrency enthusiasts are not afraid to acknowledge. For example,
VC entrepreneur Naval Ravikant suggested, “Bitcoin is a tool for freeing
humanity from oligarchs and tyrants, dressed up as a get-rich-quick
scheme.”9 Similarly, cryptocurrency developer Amir Taaki stated:
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“Bitcoins aren’t a f… payment innovation… Bitcoins are a political
project.”10
Some Characteristics of Bitcoin
The Bitcoin blockchain is a decentralized digital ledger that updates in
fixed time intervals according to a process called consensus. Bitcoin uses a
proof-of-work algorithm that requires miners to perform complicated
mathematical calculations that are energy-intensive and require
specialized mining (ASIC) computers. Several Bitcoin transactions form a
bundle or block and several blocks form a chain. The miners represent the
nodes in the Bitcoin network, and they have to confirm any change to the
encrypted ledger by adding or not adding a proposed new block. All nodes
possess a complete copy of the entire blockchain, which includes all
transactions since block 1. Anybody can connect a computer to the Bitcoin
network to mine Bitcoin by making computing power available. Miners
receive rewards in two ways: they receive a transaction fee in Bitcoin that
the user can set (a high fee means fast transactions) and they compete over
a block reward of currently 25 Bitcoin per block. The computer that is first
to complete a block, which takes in average ten minutes, receives the block
reward. The mining difficulty increases as the network grows over time.
This means that miners have to commit more and more computing power
and electricity in order to have a reasonable chance of getting the block
reward. The transactions also contain a cryptographic hash or a digital
fingerprint that is in theory impossible to forge. The proof-of-work
algorithm makes it near impossible for a malicious actor to reverse
transactions since the malicious actor would need to redo all the work
from block 1 to the current block, which is prohibitively expensive.
Hackers also cannot simply distribute a new block with fraudulent
transactions that double-spend a Bitcoin, unless a majority of miners are
cooperating in the attack, which is called a 51 percent attack.11
Users can interact with the blockchain through a digital signature or
private key that gives them control over the record associated with that
key. When a user installs a cryptocurrency wallet on a computer or mobile
phone the wallet randomly creates a public and private key. The public key
becomes the public address that allows a user to receive cryptocurrency.
Possession of the public key does not enable a hacker to infer the private
key due to asymmetric encryption. Transactions are time-stamped and are
43
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2020

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 1

in theory irreversible. More importantly, BT makes the existence of a
trusted intermediary like an escrow or notary, typical for many business
arrangements, unnecessary as all transaction are retained on an
immutable public blockchain. In other words, the blockchain eliminates
the need to trust any individual within a trusted network. William
Mougayar asserts, “Trust can be coded up, and it can be computed to be
true or false by mathematically backed certainty, that is enforced by
powerful encryption to cement it.”12 The trustless nature of the blockchain
and its ability to enforce any kinds of rules through the consensus
mechanism makes the blockchain a revolutionary and potentially a socially
disruptive technology.
Critics of Bitcoin have frequently dismissed the significance of the
innovation of BT by calling Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies worthless.
For example, President Trump claimed that cryptocurrencies “are not
money” and are “based on thin air.”13 Although Bitcoin has undergone
many severe crises since its inception with massive price fluctuations, it
has proven to be anti-fragile. After each crisis Bitcoin emerged much
stronger than before, benefitting from network effects: The more user it
has, the more valuable it becomes and the more valuable it is, the more
users it will attract. Its main value proposition is its use-case of
permissionless peer-to-peer value transfers and its guaranteed limited
supply, capped at 21 million units. Up to now, most owners of Bitcoin and
other cryptocurrencies use them merely as a speculative investment,
although there are already some limited real-world applications other than
financial speculation.
Bitcoin, Crime, and Terrorism
Criminal and terrorist organizations might be interested in
cryptocurrencies because it might be more difficult for law enforcement
agencies and counterterrorist professionals to track cryptocurrency
assets.14 Early on, criminals have turned to Bitcoin as a way of making
anonymous payments. For example, Bitcoin was the standard method of
payment for buying illegal drugs on the infamous dark web platform Silk
Road, which Ross Ulbricht had launched in July 2010.15 Silk Road
processed sales worth 9.5 million Bitcoin out of 12 million in circulation
between 2010 and 2012.16 Hackers have used Bitcoin in ransomware
attacks such as WannaCry, where a malware like CryptoLocker encrypts all
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data on compromised computers. The hackers then offer the encryption
key in exchange for a specified amount of Bitcoin.17 Not surprisingly,
government studies and academic research regarding the dangers of BT
have mainly discussed criminal and terrorist uses of cryptocurrency and
money laundering. However, Bitcoin itself is not actually anonymous but
pseudonymous: Bitcoin transactions are recorded with the sending and
receiving wallet addresses that are visible to everybody on the public
ledger.18 Any transaction linked to a particular cryptocurrency wallet (a
software or hardware that stores private keys) can be tracked and the
owner may be unmasked by using special methods of analysis and
computer forensics.19
Still, Bitcoin offers a couple of advantages to dissidents, criminals, and
terrorists. First, a government cannot stop transactions or freeze cryptoassets as would be the case with regular bank transfers and bank accounts
(unless a user holds the cryptocurrency in a cryptocurrency exchange
account within the government’s jurisdiction). Second, an individual can
store a theoretically infinite amount of value in his head simply by
memorizing a private key that gives access to funds on the blockchain.
This makes cryptocurrency hard to confiscate and hard to enforce capital
controls on, even if governments can arrest an individual or seize other
physical assets.20 Third, a resistance group can easily raise funds by
accepting cryptocurrency donations from anywhere in the world and from
anybody by simply by publishing their public cryptocurrency addresses on
a website with no need to rely on third parties, such as front organizations
and credit card companies or PayPal. For example, the Islamic State
reportedly solicited donations by posting a Bitcoin address.21
Despite these advantages, numerous disadvantages have resulted in a slow
adoption of cryptocurrency by terrorist groups. Major problems are the
great volatility of crypto-assets, which creates organizational uncertainties,
the reduced ability of terror leaders to exercise control over funds
entrusted to agents, and the problem of exchanging crypto-assets back
into fiat currencies.22 A recent RAND study therefore found that “there is
little indication that terrorist organizations are using cryptocurrency in
any sort of extensive or systematic way.”23 In the future criminals and
terrorists may turn to privacy coins such as DASH, ZCASH, and Monero,
which have achieved important innovations such as anonymization
through coin-mixing, the encryption of transaction values, and a ‘zero45
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2020

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 1

knowledge-proofs’ protocol where transactions can be confirmed without
revealing the address of the sender or recipient on the blockchain.24

Part II: Decentralized Autonomous Organizations
It has been pointed out that leaderless organizations are much more
resilient and sometimes more successful than hierarchical organizations.
Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom argued that hierarchical organizations
are like spiders: Cut their head off and they will die while leaderless
organizations are like starfish: Cut a leg off and it will regrow and the cutoff leg may itself grow into a new starfish.25 They observed “Decentralized
organizations are…trickier to understand. In a decentralized organization,
there’s no clear leader, no hierarchy, and no headquarters. When a leader
does emerge, that person has little power over others. The best that person
can do to influence people is to lead by example.”26 Analysts have
described jihadist organizations such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State as
leaderless organizations that encourage others to take the initiative to
advance a shared ideological goal.27 In recent years, terrorism experts have
noted the growth of lone wolf attacks and other forms of leaderless
resistance. For example, George Michael has claimed, “[T]he increased
frequency of these lone wolf attacks indicates a shift from terrorism by
organized groups to terrorism by unaffiliated individuals.”28 There have
been concerns over the online radicalization of individuals and the
possibility of terror organizations providing virtual training in terror
tactics to interested individuals, which may have facilitated this recent rise
in lone wolf terror attacks. BT could add new dangers by enabling new
forms of organization, of social resistance, and of terrorism. Decentralized
Autonomous Organization (DAO) is a term that can describe this new
model of a blockchain-based leaderless organization.
The Concept of the Decentralized Autonomous Organizations
As of 2019, there are two generations of blockchains: 1) the Bitcoin
protocol and derivatives of it (blockchain 1.0), and 2) smart contract
platforms (blockchain 2.0).29 Particularly important for the further
discussion are smart contract platforms. Ethereum is the first of its kind
when it launched on July 30, 2015.30 It enables programming hard rules
into a blockchain for governing transactions. Ethereum is programmable
money that allows two parties to enter a contract (via software) and that,
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for example, holds funds in escrow until objective conditions trigger a
transaction. The most common smart contracts use today is the issuance
and governance of unique digital tokens that are freely transferable and
tradeable.31 However, the most promising future application relates to the
Internet of Things For example, a smart contract may govern the use of a
rental car: If a rental car user makes a payment, the software can verify the
payment on the blockchain and will then automatically unlock the car.32
Furthermore, smart contracts can enable new forms of organization and
new ways of cooperation that do not require any fixed hierarchical
organizational structures. Smart contracts make it possible for a large
number of unconnected contributors or volunteers to spontaneously enter
into a collaborative arrangement and to form a leaderless organization.
The first experiment with a DAO for crowdfunding was a project by the
Berlin-based blockchain company Slock.it.33 The company intended the
DAO to function as an investment vehicle for Ethereum-based software
development projects. The DAO White Paper stated that a DAO “can be
used by individuals working together collaboratively outside of a
traditional corporate form. It can also be used as a registered corporate
entity to automate formal governance rules contained in corporate bylaws
or imposed by law.”34 The original DAO was thus a company without CEO
or management that was based entirely on a community of developers,
who cooperated by submitting proposals and making decisions via voting
on the blockchain.35 Slock.it issued Ethereum-based DAO tokens that
anybody could buy. Token-holders could then vote on proposals by
initiating a token transaction. Smart contracts then automatically enforced
the votes on the blockchain with nobody being in control of the process.
For example, DAO token-holders could vote on whether to reinvest any
generated profits or disperse them in Ethereum to token-holders in
proportion to their original investment.36 The management of the DAO
was therefore democratic and was based on a trustless technical system.
The DAO failed weeks after its launch in June 2016 when a technical flaw
enabled hackers to gain control over $50 million worth of Ethereum
tokens. Ethereum founder Vitalik Buterin took the radical step to reverse
the transactions on the Ethereum blockchain. Most Ethereum miners
supported Buterin’s decision to exclude the compromised transactions in
order to prevent the hackers to profit from the attack on the DAO, but
some Ethereum miners decided to maintain the original Ethereum
blockchain, which has become a separate cryptocurrency with the name
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Ethereum Classic.37 Although the first DAO was a spectacular failure, the
underlying concept is sound.38 Bitcoin itself operates like a DAO, as it
compensates miners, manages transactions, and improves its features with
no owners, no CEO, and no employees, which is in itself remarkable. 39 A
government cannot arrest the CEO of Bitcoin or order the Bitcoin
organization to cease and desist in order to stop Bitcoin’s usage.
Decentralized WikiLeaks
WikiLeaks is an excellent example for a social resistance organization that
has been transformed by the blockchain revolution. The organization
exposes government and corporate corruption by leaking original and
often sensitive documents on the Internet in a publicly available database
that is easily searchable. WikiLeaks procures these documents from
insiders, who want to expose wrongdoing on part of their own
organization by anonymously providing them to WikiLeaks, which may
then decide to publish them. Former CIA Director Mike Pompeo even
called WikiLeaks a “non-state hostile intelligence service.”40 According to a
report from the U.S. Army, “Wikileaks.org was founded by Chinese
dissidents, journalists, mathematicians, and technologists from the United
States, China, Taiwan, Europe, Australia, and South Africa” and its website
became active in early 2007.41 The front person of WikiLeaks is the
Australian Julian Assange, who is also the co-founder and driving force
behind WikiLeaks.
After WikiLeaks published the State Department cables in 2010, the U.S.
government urged banks, credit card companies, and other payment
processors to close accounts and to refuse payments to WikiLeaks, which
put enormous financial pressure on the organization. Amazon terminated
services to host the WikiLeaks website and the DNS service to the
WikiLeaks.org domain was unavailable by December 2010. Thousands of
WikiLeaks supporters around the world managed to restore the website by
mirroring it and by distributing the IP address through social media.42
Amir Taaki advocated for using Bitcoin to support WikiLeaks in 2010, but
Satoshi, who was still actively involved at the time, made the appeal to
WikiLeaks not to use Bitcoin, as it “is a small beta community in its
infancy. You would not stand to get more than pocket change, and the heat
you would bring would likely destroy us at this stage.”43 However, from
June 2011 WikiLeaks accepted donations in Bitcoin and made a strategic
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investment in the digital currency.44 Assange has since been an outspoken
promoter of Bitcoin and the blockchain. When the price of Bitcoin rose
steeply in November 2017 to over $7,000 (and eventually to over
$20,000), WikiLeaks had already accumulated 4,000 Bitcoin, which were
worth some $29 million.45 After British authorities arrested Assange on
April 11, 2019 Bitcoin dropped $300 from $5,300 to about $5,000.
Observed movements of funds from known WikiLeaks wallets led to
widespread Internet speculations that WikiLeaks may be selling off its
Bitcoin fortune to finance Assange’s legal defense.
In order to prevent an official takedown of the WikiLeaks website from the
Internet and the removal, censoring, or alteration of the leaked documents
a developer for Bitcoin Cash, Chris Troutner, decided to upload the
entirety of the WikiLeaks document collection, some 30 GB of data, on the
Inter-Planetary File System (IPFS). The IPFS is a peer-to-peer
decentralized network not on the worldwide web. Troutner has protected
the files with a cryptographic hash to ensure the integrity of the originally
uploaded files. Even if authorities shut down the website WikiLeaks.org
the original content remains available through https://wikileaks.cash or
by using the IPFS protocol directly. Troutner has also embedded he links
to the files in the Bitcoin Cash blockchain. As long as the BCH and IPFS
networks exist, everybody in the world with Internet access will be able to
view the documents and will be able to check that they are authentic (in
the narrow sense of as originally published by WikiLeaks).46 It is likely that
WikiLeaks supporters will also archive future WikiLeaks documents in this
manner. This could indicate that WikiLeaks could re-emerge as a more
decentralized, resilient, and successful organization after the demise of its
original leader.
Decentralized Illicit Marketplaces and Assassination Markets
New forms of criminal syndicates may emerge that rely on DAOs as their
main mode of organization. Criminals could cooperate on the Internet in a
leaderless, anonymous, decentralized, and trustless fashion, which could
create tremendous challenges to identify perpetrators or disrupt their
illicit activities. The main weakness of Silk Road was that it required
Ulbricht to be the webmaster and to sort out disputes between customers
and sellers with each login onto his site being potentially trackable.
Eventually the FBI could find him through an e-mail address linked to his
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real name that he had once used on a forum to post a job ad related to Silk
Road.47
A new decentralized Silk Road for illicit goods and content could appear at
any time that uses smart contracts to manage orders, to accept and release
payments, and to deduct a founders’ fee, without the need of the operators
to leave behind many digital fingerprints, if any at all. It might be
impossible to shut down a blockchain-based Silk Road, especially if its
nodes were numerous and spread across multiple jurisdictions.48
Obviously, blockchain and smart contracts would also lend themselves to
the use for blackmail and for dead hand switches that automatically
release content based on pre-programmed conditions. For example, if a
certain transaction on the blockchain has not taken place at a specific
point of time, it can trigger the smart contract function, which executes a
program.
One can also imagine the use of a DAO to facilitate an anonymous
assassination market, which is a concept originally proposed by anarchist
Jim Bell in his 1994 essay “Assassination Politics.” Bell wrote, “While it's
comparatively easy to “get away with murder,” it’s a lot harder to reward
the person who does it, and that person is definitely taking a serious risk.’
49 His solution is an anonymous assassination market, where individuals
can anonymously contribute funds for the assassination of a celebrity to a
legal organization and whoever guesses the correct death date of the
celebrity receives all the money donated. A high enough fee for making a
bet would discourage contributors from making random guesses. As the
contributions increase, so would the incentives for somebody to kill the
unpopular celebrity and collect the money.
In the blockchain age a smart contract can govern such an arrangement.
The assassin could be confident that the sponsoring organization will
make the payment for a correct bet and would be able to collect the money
in an anonymous fashion. An anonymous vote by all contributors could
establish whether the celebrity has died and could automatically release
accumulated funds to the correct guesser. According to a report by Vice,
people already use the prediction platform Augur to make bets on “the
deaths of public figures, including Betty White, Donald Trump, Jeff Bezos,
and Warren Buffett.”50 The practical advantage of an assassination market
for those participating is that it creates legal challenges as to whether
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making a bet constitutes the incitement of murder and also who could be
charged with it in case of a large number of people contributing money to
the cause of compensating somebody who makes a correct prediction.
Blockchain-Enabled Political Revolutions
During the Arab Spring small groups of activists could mobilize the masses
against the respective government through tweets, Facebook posts, and
text messaging. The Egyptian government became so desperate at one
point that they temporarily shut down the Internet and mobile services
nation-wide on January 28, 2011 to prevent the coordination of
anticipated mass protests.51 After the Arab Spring, many authoritarian
governments cracked down on social media and NGOs. Major social media
platforms and search engines, most importantly Facebook, Twitter, and
Google now face strong political demands to police content under the
threat of onerous regulation and fines. Peter Singer and Emerson
Brooking have pointed out that the social media companies have assumed
the functions of government and that “they are now grappled with
intractable political problems,” adding that the problems are of “the kind
[that are] always destined to leave a portion of its constituents
displeased.”52
As more users of social media become dissatisfied with censorship of
content, they will look towards new platforms that are censorship-free.
Many blockchain-based solutions to Internet censorship are readily
available. A good example is the Twister microblogging platform invented
by Miguel Freitas in 2014, which can be freely downloaded and which uses
a BitTorrent-like protocol to distribute data amongst users. The users can
contribute computing power to the network in exchange for free adverts
that they can send across the network.53 A San Francisco-based start-up
with the name Unstoppable Domains launched in 2018. The company
wants to create a platform that allows human-readable blockchain
addresses and to host and maintain censorship-resistant websites.54 VC
investor Tim Draper funded the start-up with $4 million. Website domains
and content would be stored on the Zilliqa blockchain and would have .zil
addresses that are not part of the Internet Domain Name System (DNS).
Since the blockchain domain does not require an entry into the centralized
registry of the DNS there is no way that a government can remove the
website or that an ISP can block access to the website. Anybody who has
51
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the domain blockchain address can view the contents. Owners of the
blockchain domain also get an integrated cryptocurrency wallet that allows
them to send a variety of cryptocurrency to other users or receive
cryptocurrency using a memorable name or phrase as address.
In the future governments will be struggling to suppress content or
prevent coordinated resistance by dissatisfied populations, as onlinebased communications services become much more decentralized and
resilient. As a general rule, no ISP is able to block user access to
blockchain-based media and messaging. Even if a government takes, the
extreme step of shutting down the Internet and mobile services there is
already a work-around for groups and individuals to maintain
communications locally or nationally. A blockchain developer from New
Zealand has demonstrated that blockchain transaction can occur in a
(partial) off-grid situation. The developer managed to send a signed
Bitcoin transaction over 19 km, using a Samourai Cryptocurrency wallet
and a mesh of several goTenna radio devices that were attached to smart
phones that had no Internet connection.55 Obviously, the transaction must
synchronize with the Internet at some point to avoid double spending, but
it demonstrates that off-grid transactions on the blockchain can occur with
inexpensive technology. Activists (or terrorists) could communicate via a
short-range radio mesh, send or receive cryptocurrency, or otherwise
interact with blockchains even when the Internet or telephone services are
temporarily down.

Part III: Government Regulation
Blockchain Technology is not limited in its utility to facilitating financial
transactions and enabling transfers of value, but has sparked a large
industry around many other potential applications, such as “inviolable
property registries,” “real-time, direct, bank-to-bank settlement of
securities exchanges,” “self-sovereign identities,” “decentralized
computing,” “decentralized Internet of Things,” “blockchain-based supply
chains,” and “decentralized media and content.”56 According to a new
market research report, companies in the United States spent $1.6 billion
in 2018 on BT and according to some projections this could increase to
$41 billion in 2025.57 Major financial institutions and IT companies have
invested in BT, including JP Morgan, UBS, IBM, Intel, Facebook, and
Microsoft. Most notably, Facebook announced that it intends to launch a
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global cryptocurrency name Libra that would allow Facebook users to
send or receive cryptocurrency on Facebook to make purchases or to
transfer money.58 The realization that cryptocurrency is here to stay is
slowly sinking in with lawmakers and regulators. Governments are no
longer able to ignore BT and they have to find regulations that allow them
to leverage the technology while also minimizing the potentially
destabilizing effects.
Identity Authentication
China is a leader in BT and the Chinese is already facing many of the
challenges outlined above. Chinese dissidents have used blockchains to
expose corruption and to distribute scandalous information on officials.59
The Chinese government is now requiring all blockchain operators to
register their code with the government, as well as all their server IPs, and
record and provide all information on their users.60 The government
threatens any Chinese blockchain company that violates these regulations
with high fines and prison sentences. Chinese Internet users who access
social media platforms or other Internet services with a VPN to hide their
online identity are also subject to punishment.
Although the extremely repressive approach of the Chinese government is
not consistent with democratic practices, there is nothing wrong in
principle with requiring robust identity authentication for accessing
Internet services, including microblogging or messaging services. Instead
of playing whack-a-mole with the Islamic State, removing fake accounts
that the terrorists can quickly reopen under a slightly different name, the
time has come for a new approach.61 The immutable nature of the
blockchain combined with the use unique cryptographic keys makes it
suitable as a method of verifying the identity of users in a number of
contexts. This provides a more convenient and secure solution than
passwords and other methods of authentication. For example, the Civic
project offers blockchain-based identity verification: Users can submit
their personal information in exchange for Civic tokens and others can pay
with Civic tokens for validating information (with the permission of the
owner of the information).62 This way a user could not easily change their
digital identity or otherwise hide their identity when they access online
services, which also reduces all kinds of identity fraud and illicit activity
online.
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Crowdsourced Counter-Messaging
Counter-messaging has been a reasonably successful approach used
against radical groups such as ISIS. Gareth Mott pointed out “[w]hile
violent extremist content hosted in an encrypted peer-to-peer manner may
have the potential to be technically resilient, this does not necessarily
make it socially resilient.” He suggests “When violent extremists elect to
use social media to further their agenda…they give their narrative(s)
visibility and open a space for them to be critiqued.”63 Suitable strategies
for dealing with problematic social messaging is to debunk false
information, to demonstrate faulty logic, to expose immoral arguments for
what they are, and to ridicule extremist positions. Instead of trying to
censor speech by removing unwanted content governments would need to
encourage virtual communities to police themselves. A moderate majority
can marginalize radical positions by voicing disagreement. Effective
counter-messaging can bury distasteful information by making it harder to
find, even if it is not possible to remove it. Most importantly, a free society
should foster a critical mindset with respect to online information to
enable people to better navigate and evaluate the information available to
them.64
Co-opt Blockchain Development
Governments may choose to support blockchain companies that build
technology more consistent with the concerns of regulators. A RAND study
pointed out that there is a middle ground between completely
decentralized and centralized ones, namely semi-centralized systems,
“where the authority mechanism is distributed among a restricted set of
participants.”65 For example, the Chinese government has chosen to
promote blockchains with a few ‘super nodes’ that are much more
centralized, as they are easier to control by the government. In this model,
transactions have to be approved or validated by a small number of
consensus nodes (21 nodes for EOS, 9 nodes for Ontology, and only 7 in
the case of NEO), which makes it effectively a closed permissioned system,
where certain users can be excluded and certain transactions can be
stopped.66 Most strikingly, EOS has already demonstrated the capacity to
reverse confirmed transactions and to freeze user accounts, which is
supposed to be impossible on a real blockchain.67
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Interestingly, Facebook is following the Chinese model as indicated in its
White Paper. The Libra Association originally planned to have one
hundred Founding Members comprised of various organizations, who
would run geographically dispersed validator nodes. It is a permissioned
system that would allow cryptocurrency transactions of a stable coin called
Libra, which would be also a hundred percent backed by a basket of
currencies and bonds.68 Despite the enormous strides Facebook made to
accommodate government concerns over regulation, the company faced
outright hostility and skepticism from U.S. legislators.69 Regardless,
Facebook is a company that is well-positioned to dominate the
cryptocurrency space since it has already a user-base of over 2 billion.

Conclusion
Senator Mike Crapo recently suggested: “If the United States were to
decide, and I’m not saying it should, if the United States decided we didn’t
want cryptocurrency to happen in the United States, and tried to ban it,
I’m pretty confident we couldn’t succeed in doing that because this is a
global tech, a global innovation.”70 He is right: Bitcoin has over 10,000 full
active nodes in over a hundred countries.71 No single government or group
of governments could hope to shut down the self-organizing and selfsustaining Bitcoin network or a similarly large blockchain network
(Ethereum). The most important feature of BT is censorship-resistance: A
government cannot remove information that resides on a decentralized
autonomous network through a court order or through pressuring the
company that originally developed the blockchain. However, this feature
does not necessarily equate in the triumph of malicious actors, who could
take advantage of the technology. As Kevin Werbach has argued, “The
global scale of blockchain networks does not prevent nations from
enforcing their laws. Coordination among law enforcement and
mechanisms such as extradition can be used to bring criminals to
justice.”72 However, what could be an even bigger challenge than BTrelated cybercrime is BT-enabled social or civil resistance that could make
opposition to authority much easier to join and to sustain in the end
through the self-organizing trustless mechanism of a DAO. Governments
and regulators need to have a more nuanced understanding of the
technology, so that society can take advantage of the innovative potential
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of the technology while mitigating some of the politically destabilizing
effects.
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